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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
FELONY INFORMATION: DUE PROCESS AND
PRELIMINARY HEARING ON PROBABLE CAUSE
Defendants were charged with manslaughter by an information
filed directly in superior court. They made timely motion to dismiss,
contending that the information was defective because not found
before a grand jury, or alternatively that due process required a deter-
mination before either a grand jury or a committing magistrate that
probable cause existed to hold the defendants for trial. The motion was
granted. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed. Held:
Due process does not require persons charged with an infamous crime
to be indicted by a grand jury or afforded a preliminary hearing on the
issue of probable cause, State v. Kanistanaux, 68 Wash. Dec. 2d 647,
414 P.2d 784 (1966).
There are four modes of commencing felony prosecution in Wash-
ington: grand jury indictment,' direct information,2 coroner's inquest,3
and felony complaint 4 In urban areas of the state, the standard prac-
tice is to refer the decision on probable cause to a committing magis-
trate, and to reserve the grand jury for cases requiring use of its
inquisitorial powers.5 In rural areas, however, the direct filing proce-
dure is the prevalent mode of commencing prosecutions.6 Although
indictment by grand jury is constitutionally required to commence
federal prosecutions for infamous crimes,7 the U.S. Supreme Court in
Hurtado v. Californias held that states may prosecute such crimes by
IWASH. CONST. art. I § 25; WASH. Rxv. CODE ch. 10.28 (1956) passiln; WASH.
REv. CODE § 10.37.015 (1956).
'WASH. CONST. art. I, § 25; WASH. REv. CODE § 10.37.026 (1956).
'WASH. REV. CODE § 36.24.070-.080, .100 (1963).
'WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.16.010, .070-.080 (1956); WASH. R. CRix. CTs. LTD.
JURISDICTION 2.01, 2.03e(2).
'Brief of the Washington State Association of Prosecuting Attorneys as Amicus
Curiae, p. 4, Kanistanaux.
'Ibid. The direct information procedure places the accused on trial without
indictment or preliminary hearing to inquire into probable cause. It consists of
the filing by the prosecutor with the court of a signed and verified statement charging
the accused with commission of the offense in ordinary and concise language com-
prehensible to a person of common understanding. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.37.050
(1956).
"U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
8110 U.S. 516 (1884). The California constitution required as a prerequisite to
filing a felony information that an accused be examined before a committing
[903]
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information. The constitutionality of a prosecution for infamous crime
commenced solely at the prosecutor's discretion has never been pro-
perly presented to the United States Supreme Court.'
The Washington supreme court, relying on Hurtado,10 reasoned that
there was no right to grand jury indictment in state prosecutions.
Following dictum in Lem Woon v. Oregon," where preliminary hearing
was waived, the court concluded that there was no right to preliminary
hearing in state prosecutions. While the court recognized that Hurtado
had been limited insofar as its reasoning purported to apply to funda-
mental rights,"2 it concluded that failure to overrule Hurtado in cases
limiting it could only mean that due process did not require grand jury
indictment because denial of grand jury indictment did not violate
fundamental principles of liberty and justice. The court reasoned that
as denial of grand jury indictment did not involve fundamental rights,
Lem Woon"3 sustained the direct information procedure. If filing
a direct information was constitutional, the court concluded the prose-
cutor must be able, consistently with due process, to determine prob-
able cause. The court noted that Ocampo v. United States,'4 arising
under the so-called Philippine Bill of Rights, held that determination
of probable cause was "quasi-judicial" and could be vested in the
prosecutor. This confirmed the court's conclusion that use of a direct
information did not deny due process.
Analysis of the principal case must rest on a thorough examination
of Hurtado and the cases following it. The Hurtado case is usually
cited for its negative implication-that there is no right to a grand
magistrate. The accused had been examined in accordance with this procedure,
and bound over for trial.
In addition to its holding, Hurtado was considered a tour de force on the meaning
of due process. The opinion rejected the theory that 'due process' required specific
modes of procedure. See also Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900) and Walker
v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875).
' See note 23 infra.
10 110 U.S. at 534-35.
"229 U.S. 586 (1913).
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932):
[N]otwithstanding the sweeping character of the language in the Hurtado case,
the rule laid down is not without exceptions. The rule is an aid to construction,
and in some cases may be conclusive; but it must yield to more compelling
considerations whenever such considerations exist. The fact that the right
involved is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those
'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions' (Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312) is obviously
one of those compelling considerations which must prevail....
See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355, 342 (1963).
"229 U.S. at 590.
"234 U.S. 91 (1914).
[ VOL. 42: 903
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jury indictment in state prosecutions' 5-although Hurtado held only
that an accused may be prosecuted for an infamous crime by informa-
tion, if he has received a preliminary hearing on the issue of probable
cause." The reasoning in Hurtado derived much of its force from the
Court's exclusion of the fifth amendment grand jury right in inter-
preting fourteenth amendment due process. That exclusion rested on
the use of the words "due process" in the fifth amendment. As these
words appeared in addition to the grand jury guarantee in the fifth
amendment, the words "due process" in the fourteenth amendment
could not include the grand jury guarantee." Such analysis, founded
on rules of construction, was limited by Powell v. Alabama, 8 which
concluded such construction was valid only when fundamental rights
were not involved.
A general, ostensive definition of a fundamental right has been
avoided by the Court.'9 Descriptions,"° and various summaries of
rights,21 have been given. Until Hurtado is overruled, it must be con-
' 110 U.S. at 520-37. See e.g., ANTINEAU, COMMNTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 168 (1960) ; FoaxoscH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 427 (1963) ;
RorrISCHAEFFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 319-20, at 781 (1939). But see Library of
Cong., The Constitution of the United States-Analysis and Interpretation, S. Doc.
No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1217-18 (1964), for a concise statement of Hurtado and
its relation to Lem Woon v. Oregon.
"' 110 U.S. at 538. [Emphasis added]:
Tried by these principles, we are unable to say that the substitution for a present-
ment or indictment by a grand jury of the proceeding by information after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, certifying to the probable guilt
of the defendant, with the right on his part to the aid of counsel, and to the
cross-examination of the witnesses produced for the prosecution, is not due
process of law.
110 U.S. at 534-35.
2287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877). See, e.g., Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). The majority of the Court flatly rejected the conten-
tion that the first eight amendments of the federal Constitution had been made
applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. Justices Black and Douglas,
dissenting, argued that the fourteenth amendment had been enacted for that very
purpose. 332 U.S. at 71-72. Justices Murphy and Rutledge indicated agreement with
Black's position, but did not wish to restrict the rights protected by the due process
clause to those enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concur-
ring, provided an excellent summary of the arguments against "incorporation."
332 US.. at 59-68. See also Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate
the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949); Frankfurter, Memorandum on
'Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights Into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 78 HAnv. L. REv. 746 (1965).
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), (fundamental principles of liberty andjustice); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), (implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty). The Palko test of due process is often quoted but its content is
evasive. For example, the privilege against self-incrimination is not within Palko's
coverage (302 U.S. at 325, citing Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908)) but
was held to bind the states on due process grounds. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1(1964). And compare Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) with Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
21 Compare the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg in Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400, 410 (1965), with Frankfurter, supra note 19.
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ceded that a right to grand jury indictment, standing alone, is not
fundamental.
It must be noted, however, that Hurtado held that an information
preceded by a preliminary hearing on probable cause might be sub-
stituted for grand jury indictment. It is entirely consistent with this
holding to assert that there is a fundamental right in state prosecutions
for infamous crimes to either indictment or preliminary hearing. This
vitiates the court's reasoning in the principal case that if Hurtado had
involved fundamental rights, it would necessarily have been overruled.
A concise statement of the asserted right would be that there is a
fundamental right to an independent determination of probable cause
in cases involving infamous crimes, even though the states are free to
select their own procedure for that determination.
This hypothetical right is contrary to dictum in Lem Woon v. Ore-
gon,2" the only case following Hurtado which even perfunctorily ex-
amined the right to a preliminary hearing23 Unfortunately the funda-
mental rights doctrine was not considered in Lem Woon, because the
case antedated Powell v. Alabama.
In Lem Woon, a preliminary hearing not required by statute was
offered the accused and was waived. The Supreme Court chose to
ignore the waiver.2 4 From the premise that there is no right to grand
jury indictment in state prosecutions-the negative implication of
Hurtado-the Court deduced a fortiori that there could be no right to
a preliminary hearing.25 Since the decision in Powell v. Alabama, this
-229 U.S. 586 (1913).
'In the following cases, Hurtado was cited as directly in point: Hodgson v.
Vermont, 168 U.S. 262 (1897); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); cf. Davis
v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399 (1900). Hurtado was cited as controlling, and standing denied
to assert lack of preliminary hearing in an effort to distinguish Hurtado, in:
Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83(1899); McNulty v. California, 149 U.S. 645 (1892). In Gaines v. Washington,
277 U.S. 81 (1928), challenge to an information filed without a return of the coroner'sjury was termed frivolous, without further discussion. The issue had not been
raised in the state court. See State v. Gaines, 144 Vash. 446, 258 Pac. 508 (1927).
All of the cases pre-date Powell.
'In only four sentences, the Court held that the distinction as to lack of pre-
liminary hearing was invalid, and the waiver immaterial. It therefore affirmed on
the authority of Hurtado. While this may have been a valid argument prior to
Powell v. Alabama, it now begs the question.
'Compare this reasoning with United States v. M1otte, 251 F. Supp. 601(S.D.N.Y. 1966) and People v. Jackson, 48 Misc. 2d 1026, 266 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Sup.
Ct., 1965).
The claim "no constitutional right to preliminary hearing" is frequently based
on decisions involving discovery, Dillard v. Bomar, 342 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 1965),
or denial of confrontation of witnesses, Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70, 73(1895). But see, as to the latter, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Neither
[ VOL. 42: 903
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reasoning is untenable, for it assumes as a premise the conclusion
which it seeks to prove. One cannot argue a fortiori from Hurtado,
in which the asserted right to an independent determination of prob-
able cause was safeguarded by preliminary hearing, to prove that a
right to preliminary hearing does not exist. 6
It is apparent that the court erred in the principal case when it
stated that Hurtado foreclosed the fundamental rights issue. Yet in
spite of the weakness in the Washington court's arguments, there are
reasons for approving its decision. Most of the argument presented
to the court was grounded on the "incorporation" theory. The trend
of recent decisions involving "incorporation" has been to extend the
full measure of federal restrictions to the states. 8 Yet the right arising
from application of the "incorporation" theory to the principal case
would be a right to grand jury indictment, not to a preliminary hearing
on probable cause. In light of recent thought on the efficacy of the
grand jury,29 judicial promulgation of such a right would be anachron-
istic. Reliance on "incorporation" in attacks on the direct informa-
tion procedure should be avoided. The incorporation argument's con-
clusion overreaches its merits.
The incorporation argument does not, however, exhaust the reach of
the due process clause. 0 The activities of the Michigan one-man
grand jury have twice run afoul of the due process clause's prohi-
bitions." It is desirable to consider whether the presence of a specific
these decisions, nor those above denying hearing after indictment, have any bearing
on the right to an independent determination of probable cause.
' The Washington cases cited to support the holding of the principal case rest
solely on the Hurtado due process rationale. See State v. Westphal, 62 Wn. 2d 301,
382 P.2d 269 (1963) ; In re Wilburn v. Cranor, 40 Wn. 2d 38, 240 P.2d 563 (1952);
In re Payne v. Smith, 30 Wn. 2d 646, 192 P.2d 964 (1948).
-'Brief for Respondent, pp. 12-20; Brief for American Civil Liberties Union
as Amicus Curiae, pp. 4-14. Even the ACLU brief provides no rationale for the
"incorporation" of a right to preliminary hearing, although its due process attack
is directed at the Hurtado line of cases.
'Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963). Further examples of state-federal parity of conduct on constitutional require-
ments are: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).
' See Calkins, Abolition of the Grand Jury Indictment in Illinois, 1966 U. ILL.
L.F. 423.
" See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. at 124 (Justices Murphy and Rutledge,
dissenting). Cf. Rudman, "Incorporation" under the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 LAW
Ix TRANSrrION Q. 141 (1966), commenting on the restrictiveness of incorporation
theory. Rutledge and Murphy add a natural law test to the examination of procedure,
in addition to the provisions of the Bill of Rights. The anti-incorporationist
justices have consistently maintained that due process is to be defined purely from
considerations of essential fairness. The difficulties inherent in this approach are
amply demonstrated by the state confession cases between Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278 (1936) and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) ; In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
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guarantee in the Bill of Rights is, to speak metaphorically, proof that
the right protected is fundamental, or evidence that the area protected
by the guarantee contains a fundamental right not expressly specified
in the guarantee. Such an approach does not necessarily reintroduce
the properly abandoned doctrine of Betts v. Brady.2 That case, by
conditioning a right to counsel on substantial prejudice to the defen-
dant's interests, forced an ad hoc determination of the due process
issue, and was subsequently denounced as enforcing a "watered-down"
version of the Bill of Rights. 3 Gideon v. Wainwright,4 by incorpora-
tion, avoided another alternative. By considering assistance of coun-
sel as evidence of a fundamental right, the Court might have created
a right to an advocate who was not a member of the bar. Such
recognition would be based on general due process notions, 5 rather
than incorporation. A more pointed example of the use of generalized
due process by the Court may be found in adoption of the exclusionary
rule in Mapp v. Ohio.36 Generalized due process co-exists with in-
corporative due process within the scope of the fourteenth amendment.
Yet the criterion by which one rejects a procedure as violative of
generalized due process is vague. Denial of preliminary hearing does
not "shock the conscience,1 37 even in an intellectual sense. Arguably,
' 316 U.S. 455 (1942). See Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274-75
(1960) (dissent).
"See Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, supra note 32, at 275.
'372 U.S. 335 (1963).
"See note 30 supra and note 36 infra. By use of the term "generalized due
process," argument about the philosophic basis of what the Court has done may be
avoided. Whatever that basis, it is clear that the decisions rest on a rationale far
removed from incorporation.
- 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The fundamental nature of the right was not in issue
in Mapp. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30-32 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
at 650; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,33 (1949). The exclusionary rule was
announced in Weeks v. United States to cure "prejudicial error." 232 U.S. 383,
398 (1914). Wolf considered it a matter of state policy. In Mapp, four justices
adverted to a constitutional basis in the fifth amendment, but established the rule
because of the inadequacy of alternatives, 367 U.S. at 650-54, 655-57, which is a
generalized due process rationale, and on grounds of state-federal symmetry. Id.,
at 657-59. See also Mapp, supra at 669-71, (Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring);
Wolf, supra at 41-47 (Mr. Justice Murphy, dissenting). Justice Black, concurring,
found a constitutional basis in the overlap of the fourth and fifth amendments.
Mapp, supra at 661-66.
In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1955), the Court rested its refusal to give
the doctrine of Mapp retrospective effect on the ground that the rule had been
promulgated to curb police misconduct. Id., at 636-37. That reason is inconsistent
with the fundamental right test of incorporative due process. Mapp cannot be
explained by incorporation, even though the Court in Mapp examined the overlap
reasoning of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). That reasoning could have
no force in Mapp, which predates the incorporation of the privilege against self-
incrimination by three years. See Mapp, supra at 685-86 (dissent) and see Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
' Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). Although the decision reached
in Mapp, appears to lessen the burden to be satisfied in invoking generalized due
[ VOL. 42 : 903
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denial of any review of the probable cause issue would be an improper
merger of prosecutorial and judicial functions.38 But while acceptable
constitutional principles allow destruction of the direct information
procedure, they do not compel its destruction.
Whatever force is given constitutional objections to the direct in-
formation, to make the prosecutor a judge without review of who
shall be tried for felony without preliminary hearing or indictment is
to vest in him an arbitrary discretion. This is unsound policy.39 Cer-
tain collateral matters suggest that the defendant's interests involved
are substantial. For example, the same personal interests which a right
to indictment protects are safeguarded in civil cases by the tort of slan-
der per se,4" whereby action will lie for injury to reputation resulting
from accusation of an infamous crime. As the prosecutor is immune
from this tort, arguably his discretion should be balanced by some pro-
cedural check.41 Requiring independent determination of probable
cause would furnish a procedural safeguard benefitting the accused
without involving the restraint on vigorous prosecution which could
occur if tort liability were feared.
The grand jury has been considered the guardian of the average, as
well as the political, defendant.42 Even its critics urge that it should
process, a statement of the showing required seems even more difficult than under
the Powell and Palko criteria. See note 20 supra.
See notes 48 and 49 infra.
" The proper ambit of the prosecutor's discretion would appear to be that set
by California. See Klein, District Attorney's Discretion Not to Prosecute, 32 Los
AurNELES B. BULL. 323 (1957). Cf. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965), 18 VAND. L. REv. 2062.
" Parallelism between rights secured under the fifth amendment grand jury pro-
vision and the tort of slander per se based on an accusation of crime is instructive.
The actionable accusation must be of an indictable crime, involving infamous
punishment or moral turpitude. 1 HARPER AND JAmms, TORTS § 5.10 at 376 (1956).
The crime must be chargeable by indictment or information and punishable by death
or imprisonment other than in lieu of a fine. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 571. The
interest protected has, however, been related to "major social disgrace", rather than
the accidents of criminal procedure or the vagaries of punishment. See PROSSER,
TORTS § 107 at 773-74 (3d ed. 1964). Any of the above tests would be satisfied by
the crime of manslaughter charged in the principal case.
" Prosecutors are generally immune from malicious prosecution actions on the
ground that personal liability for official acts is contrary to the public interest served
by free and vigorous action. See Creelman v. Svenning, 67 Wn. 2d 882, 410 P.2d 606
(1966); Anderson v. Manley, 181 Wash. 327, 43 P.2d 39 (1935); 1 HARPER AND
JAms, TORTS, § 113 at 855-56 (3d ed. 1964).
' See Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887):
[I]t remains true that the grand jury is as valuable as ever in securing, in the
language of Chief Justice Shaw in the case of Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray 329,
"individual citizens from ... a public accusation of crime, and from the trouble, ex-
pense, and anxiety of a public trial before probable cause is established by the
presentment and indictment of such a [grand] jury.....
This position was reaffirmed in Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 9 (1959).
1967]
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be replaced by preliminary hearing, rather than abolished 3 although
the preliminary hearing is sometimes a perfunctory safeguard.44 Dis-
carding such ancillary matters as the use of preliminary hearing for
discovery, it is better to provide a defendant with some protection than
none.
While the prevalence of the direct information in rural counties, 3
where justices of the peace may be without legal training," may
constitute an explanation of the court's action, it does not constitute a
countervailing policy justification.
Because Hurtado does not foreclose the fundamental rights problem,
and relieve the court of its duty to balance the interests involved, the
actual basis of the court's reasoning in the principal case is not
Hurtado or Lem Woon, but Ocampo v. United States.4 7  That case
states that the determination of probable cause is a quasi-judicial
function, which therefore may be vested in the prosecutor. Recent
decisions involving the exercise of accusatory or investigatory func-
tions in the same case by the same person later called upon to make a
judicial" or quasi-judicial49 determination are irreconciliable with
Ocampo. The term quasi-judicial as used in Ocampo is not an argu-
ment. It is a cloak for a conclusion as to the nature of procedural due
process, and should be used only after evaluation of the interests in-
volved. Apart from problems caused by Ocampo having arisen under
' See Calkins, supra note 29, vigorously arguing for adoption of information
after preliminary hearing as superior to the grand jury in all cases other than
investigation of political corruption and syndicated crime.
"See Note, Preliminary Hearings on Indictable Offenses in Philadelphia, 106
U. PA. L. REv. 589 (1958).
"See note 5 supra.
"Ibid.; WASH. REv. CODE § 3.34.060 (1965).
'7234 U.S. 91 (1914).
'It would be very strange if our system of law permitted a judge to act as a
grand jury and then try the very persons accused as a result of his investiga-
tions.... A single "judge-grand jury" is even more a part of the accusatory
process than the ordinary lay grand juror. Having been a part of that process ajudge cannot be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the convic-
tion or acquittal of those accused. While he would not likely have all the -Cal of
a prosecutor, it can certainly not be said that he would have none of that zeal.
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955), reversing contempt conviction tried by
citing judge. [Emphasis added]
The Court reserved the question of the constitutionality of the one man grandjury. It is submitted that if an accused is entitled to a determination of probable
cause prior to standing trial, that determination cannot be made by the prosecutor,
unless the logic of Murchison is rejected as wholly inapplicable to a preliminary
proceeding.
"American Cyanamid Company v. F.T.C., 363 F.2d 757, 763-67 (6th Cir. 1966),
(Comm'r disqualified as trier of fact by prior service as Counsel to Senate com-
mittee investigating same transactions); Trans World Airlines v. C.A.B., 254 F.2d
90 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Board member disqualified by prior participation as attorney
presenting government's case).
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federal statute rather than the Constitution,' ° by its involvement of a
misdemeanor rather than an infamous crime, 1 and by its age and
circumstances, 2 it is unconvincing for court and counsel in the prin-
cipal case to have devoted the greater part of their effort to issues not
actually relevant to the interests involved. The court's reliance on
Ocampo, which fails to examine those interests from the standpoint of
due process, results in a similar defect in the principal case. Ocampo
is neither authoritative nor convincing. Since neither Ocampo nor
Hurtado and Lem Woon present any analysis of the constitutional
issues actually involved in disposition of the principal case, the court
has in effect rendered a per curiam opinion on the due process issues.
Further attempts to challenge the direct information should concen-
trate on generalized notions of due process, 3 or an extension of the
arguments for criminal discovery.54 To sustain a procedure so clearly
open to misuse as the optional direct information for inadequate proof
of abuse" is a perversion of the state freedom to experiment recog-
nized in Hurtado.
V The Court has rejected the cases arising under the Philippine Bill of Rights,
32 Stat. 691 (1902), as constitutional precedent. Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 194-97 (1957). See Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 478 n.3 (1958) (Mr.
Justice Douglas, dissenting).
Nor did the Court in Ocampo make any pretense of construing the Constitution,
as indicated by this language:
Section 5 of the Act of Congress contains no specific requirement of a present-
ment or indictment by grand jury, such as is contained in the Fifth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States. And in this respect, the Constitution
does not, of its own force, apply to the islands.
234 U.S. at 98. The Court then cited the Insular Cases: Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190
U.S. 197 (1903), Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904), and Dowdell v. United
States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911).
" The charge was criminal libel-a misdemeanor. Acts of the Philippine
Commission-24 Oct. 1901, No. 277.
" Considered apart from its nature as constitutional precedent, the case is fraught
with defects. The greater part of the opinion is devoted to another issue-equal
protection, and the due process problems are inadequately discussed. The argument
turned on use of the label "quasi-judicial" rather than any attempt to examine policy.
On the merits, Ocampo had libelled a member of the Philippine Commission. He
was pardoned prior to execution of the sentence, and became a minor national hero
as the result of the case. HAYDEN, TiE PHILIPPINEs 607 (1942).
See notes 30 and 36, supra.
&4 An attack on the discovery arguments is found in Dillard v. Bomar, 342 F.2d
789 (6th Cir. 1965). For an overall canvass of the interests involved at preliminary
hearing, see Note, 51 IowA L. REv. 164 (1965). The issue of discovery was rejected
by the court in the principal case as not compelling.
' See 68 Wash. Dec. 2d at 652, 414 P.2d at 787. Such proof could probably concern
either actual abuse (due process), or consist of a statistical analysis of the prevailing
prosecutorial practice (equal protection). As to the latter, cf. Rabinowitz v. United
States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966), 42 WAsH. L. REv. 280.
1967]
